How Persistent Is Social Capital?*

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Abstract

Social capital and other informal institutions are said to be highly persistent, with historical events such as conflict, dictatorship or colonization having a long-lasting effect. I test this proposition utilizing regions that experienced large-scale population displacements after WWII. As social capital is accumulated through relationships and connections, regions that were repopulated by migrants from a wide range of backgrounds are likely to have little inherited social capital. My analysis suggests that the repopulated regions are little different from those unaffected by population transfers. Hence, contrary to the Putnamesque view, contemporaneous social capital need not be determined by long-term historical legacies. I argue that the break-down of law and order and prevalence of organized crime and corruption are more likely explanations for low levels of social capital in Southern Italy and Eastern Europe than historical legacies.

Keywords: social capital; trust; networks; institutions; migration; population transfers; organized crime; corruption.

JEL Codes: Z13, P36, O57, O17

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“人 走 茶 凉 (people go, tea cold),” Chinese proverb.

1 Introduction

Social capital – informal norms of behavior that affect the quantity and quality of social interactions – is generally accepted as an important factor of economic and social development. Past research has shown that it is associated with a broad range of favorable economic and social outcomes. It helps overcome free riding and rent seeking, increases economic efficiency and fosters economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005) and leads to greater investment in human capital (Coleman, 1988; Özcan and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Méon, 2012). More broadly, Greif (1994) posits that common culture (defined broadly so that it encompasses various informal norms and institutions including social capital) in medieval societies reduced free riding and opportunistic behavior. Tabellini (2010) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) make similar points. In summary, developed industrialized economies tend to display plentiful social capital; conversely, low stock of social capital can constitute an impediment to economic development and prosperity.

Indeed, in an influential study, Putnam (1993) observes the large economic and social differences between North and South Italy and argues that they can be attributed to social capital being much lower in the South than in the North. Furthermore, he posits that this social capital gap reflects the different historical experiences of the two regions following the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Southern part of Italy was conquered by Arabs in the 9th century, who were replaced by Normans in the 10th century. Both conquerors implemented an autocratic feudal top-down regime. This, it is argued, discouraged trust and cooperative behavior. In contrast, the various kingdoms and city states of North Italy adopted relatively liberal forms of government that encouraged wider participation of citizens in decision making and bottom-up liberal rule. This had important implications for the economic development of the two regions too. In the South, wealth was derived from owning land and controlling labor that worked it. North Italians, in contrast, became rich by engaging in commerce and finance, areas which crucially depend on trust, cooperation and reciprocity. These differences in historical legacies are said to have laid foundations for the economic success of the North and the economic and social underdevelopment of the South. The North

became urbanized, industrialized and rich. The South, in contrast, turned out poor, corrupt and riddled with organized crime.

The Putnamesque view thus sees social capital as being accumulated only slowly and having been shaped by historical legacies in a long-lasting manner: the eight centuries of Norman rule have not been undone by the subsequent 150 years of Italian unification. This resonates also with evidence on other norms and institutions, whether formal or informal, which appear highly persistent over time. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson in their broad and varied research (see their 2005 overview for a summary) argue that institutions, and economic development, in emerging economies were shaped by the colonial experience. The colonies with climate favorable to settlement by Europeans imported institutions prevailing in the home countries of the colonists. In contrast, colonies with inhospitable climates (mainly because of rampant tropical diseases) inherited institutions geared towards profit maximization and wealth extraction. Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that exposure to slave trade has had a similarly lasting effect on West African countries. These institutions have remained in place also after independence and continue to affect economic development of these countries to present day.

Italy is not the only European country, parts of which were subject to different (colonial) historical legacies. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2014) and Wysokinska (2011) consider the legacy of the partitions of Poland, whereby the country was absorbed into the Prussian, Russian and Hapsburg Empires by 1795, to be restored only in 1918. They find lasting effects on political attitudes, civic participation and trust as well as economic development of the former intra-Polish borders: the Prussian legacy appears favorable, especially compared to the Russian one. Becker et al. (2011) similarly find evidence of a positive Habsburg legacy effect on corruption and trust throughout Eastern Europe: today's Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Monte Negro and Serbia were divided by the Habsburg borders in the past. They attribute this legacy to the effectiveness of the Austrian civil service. Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007), Grosjean (2009), Roland (2010) and Karaja (2014) reach similar conclusions about the persistence of culture, attitudes and institutions. These studies thus all seem to suggest that cultural norms and attitudes can persist over several generations or even centuries.[3] This may translate into an

[3] Voigtländer and Voth (2011), similarly, find that the geographical distribution of pogroms against Jews in medieval Germany during the Black Death epidemic (14th century) strongly correlates with the persecution of Jews and support for the Nazis during the 1930s. In a follow-up study, Voigtländer and Voth (2012), find that the geographic distribution of votes for anti-Semitic parties in Germany in 1890 and 1920-30s correlates very

important developmental disadvantage for countries that, for whatever reason, inherited poor culture and institutions or, indeed, social capital. South Italy is not the only such case. Paldam and Svendsen (2000), Growiec and Growiec (2011) and others suggest that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe destroyed social capital by instilling in people a constant sense of fear and distrust. Should this 'treatment effect' be indeed as persistent as the literature suggests, then countries from Poland to North Korea can see their growth prospects impeded for generations.

Putnam's view of historical determinants of social capital has found considerable support in the literature, both on the theoretical and empirical fronts. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008a), in a carefully executed empirical study, revisit the Italian example and argue that the variation in social capital exists not only between North and South Italy, but also between a-priori similar cities within the North which subsequently diverged: some became relatively liberal free-city states while others belonged to authoritarian states. Using difference-in-difference approach, they find that approximately one half of the social-capital gap between North and South can be attributable to the historical legacy of free-city states in the North.[4] In a related paper, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) formulate a theoretical model to show that a relatively brief exposure to adverse conditions can leave a society trapped in a low-trust equilibrium.[5]

Putnam's thesis, however, is based on the observation that South Italy has both lower social capital and lower level of economic development than North Italy. That says little about the direction of causality between the two phenomena. It may well be that lower level of economic development affects social capital or that both the social-capital and developmental gaps are driven by a third factor (Guiso et al, 2008, discus at length the possibility that geography plays a role in Italy). Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2008) make this point in relation to the low social capital observed in the formerly communist countries: they posit that this gap can be largely attributed to their lower level of economic development and poor institutional environment rather than be a permanent communist legacy. While their analysis is of static nature, the recent growth performance of the post-communist countries paints a rather more optimistic picture.

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strongly with anti-Semitic attitudes expressed in opinion surveys in 1996 and 2006.

[4] See also Tabellini (2010).

[5] Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2012) make a similar point in their paper.

To address the issue of persistence of social capital (and of other informal norms and institutions) convincingly, one needs a natural experiment. To this effect, I identify regions that, due to their specific historical circumstances, are likely to have inherited little or no social capital. Specifically, I consider areas that experienced large-scale population transfers in their not-too-distant past. Social capital is, at least in part, embedded in relationships and created through repeated social interactions. People who move are therefore likely to lose some of their pre-migration stock of social capital, unless much of their social environment moves with them. Moreover, informal norms and institutions are likely to differentiate between one's peers and strangers: old neighbors are usually seen as more trustworthy than newcomers.[6] More generally, even when one is prepared to trust strangers, such generalized trust is likely to be higher with respect to individuals with whom one shares characteristics such as common customs, regional accent, religion and the like. Therefore, regions that experienced large-scale population transfers should initially have a low stock of inherited social capital: in essence, they are starting anew, with a clean slate. Looking at inhabitants of such regions a few generations later and comparing them with their compatriots unaffected by such population transfers can give us an indication how quickly social capital is rebuild.

Most of the population transfers that constitute my natural experiment resulted from border changes in the aftermath of World War II. Unlike with previous wars, border changes after WWII were often accompanied by large-scale expulsions of the people finding themselves on the wrong side of the new border, to be replaced by settlers from the annexing country. In some cases, those settlers were themselves refugees due to another border change elsewhere. The most dramatic case is Poland: the borders of this country moved by approximately 200 miles to the West. In the process, Eastern Poland was annexed by the Soviet Union, while Poland in turn annexed the formerly German areas East of the Oder-Neisse line, including approximately half of East Prussia. The vast majority of the ethnic German inhabitants either fled before the advancing front or were forcibly expelled after the annexation, to be replaced by Poles. Similarly, Germans were expelled from the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia while Italians were driven out or fled the Istria Peninsula and areas along the Dalmatian coast ceded to Yugoslavia (present day Slovenia and Croatia). Finally, the Dutch province of Flevoland was established in areas reclaimed from the sea and the vast

[6] This is the basis of the often-made distinction between bonding and bridging social capital: the former applies to social ties and interactions between members of the same group while the latter to members of other groups (Putnam, 2000).

majority of its inhabitants are immigrants from elsewhere in the Netherlands or descendants of such immigrants.

The key assumption underlying my analysis is that large-scale expulsions and population transfers as experienced by these regions indeed destroy social capital. Unfortunately, no measures of social capital are available for the period in the immediate aftermath of these migrations. Nevertheless, this assumption is corroborated by Matějka (2008) who discusses extensively the post-war social development of Sudetenland. He argues that the expulsion of Germans from Sudetenland and its repopulation by settlers with a wide range of backgrounds and motivations resulted in a very low initial level of social capital and a general sense of alienation. Consequently, the settlers never felt at home in Sudetenland, which lead them to invest little in building new social ties there. Indeed, he points out that it was only the children of the original settlers who managed to overcome the legacy of repopulation. His account of social capital in Sudetenland therefore suggests that the settlers did indeed lose a significant part of their social capital and also that only their children managed to recover from this negative shock.

I briefly outline the history of regions that experienced large-scale population transfers in the following section. In section 3, I introduce the survey data that I utilize to measure social capital, which is followed by the empirical analysis comparing individual-level social capital between repopulated regions and the rest in section 4. I show that the repopulated regions do not display any lasting legacy of the population transfers on contemporaneous stocks of social capital. In the final two sections, I summarize my findings and propose some explanations why some possible reasons why some dramatic historical episodes leave a lasting legacy in social capital and informal norms while others do not. I argue that the replacement of strong regime by weak ones and their subsequent capture by organized crime plays an instrumental role in that explanation.

2 A Brief History of Population Transfers in Europe

The final year of World War II and the ensuing years were associated with massive involuntary population movements of Germans from the Eastern regions of the Third Reich and, to a lesser extent, of other ethnic groups. It is estimated that over 12 million Germans were displaced during the last year of the war and in its aftermath (Prauser and Rees, 2004).

Initially, the Germans were moving on their own accord or were evacuated by the German authorities in order to escape the advancing Soviet troops. Following the conclusion of the war, further expulsions of ethnic Germans resulted from the border changes agreed by the Allies in the concluding phase of the war.

The postwar settlement awarded Poland the parts of Germany lying East of the Oder and Neisse rivers: Posen, Pomerania, Silesia, the Free City of Danzig as well as the Southern half of East Prussia (with the rest of East Prussia, including the city of Königsberg, today's Kaliningrad, being annexed by the Soviet Union). While these areas, referred to by the Poles as *Recovered Territories*[7], did have some Polish inhabitants (as well as members of other Slavic minority groups) before the War, the bulk of the inhabitants were Germans. The vast majority of these, were expelled by the Polish authorities (some fled during the last months of the war on their own). It is estimated that 7 million Germans were driven out from the areas annexed by Poland (Kamusella, 2004).[8] In the present territorial structure of Poland, the annexed territories correspond quite closely to the Dolnoslaskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, Warminsko-mazurskie and Zachodno-pomorskie provinces while Pomorskie and Sląskie provinces consist both of annexed territories and those that were part of pre-war Poland.

Poland did not only gain territory: it lost *Kresy*, its Eastern provinces, which were annexed by the Soviet Union. This was due to the insistence by the Soviet Union to establish the post-war Soviet-Polish border on the Curzon Line: the demarcation line that was originally intended as the Russian-Polish border in the wake of World War I but was later disregarded after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and Polish territorial gains at Soviet Russia's expense). The population of Kresy was mixed – besides Poles, they were inhabited by Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians and (before the German occupation) Jews. However, the provinces of Lwów (now Lviv, Ukraine), Tarnopol (Ternopil, Ukraine) and Wilna (Vilnuis, Lithuania) were dominated by ethnic Poles. After the Soviet Union annexed them, most Poles living there were either forcibly expelled or compelled to leave by gradually intensifying repression.

The Recovered Territories were resettled by a mix of Polish refugees from Kresy, ethnic Poles moving back to Poland from other countries, settlers from central Poland, as well as ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians from the areas next to Kresy. Around 5.3 million Poles

[7] Poland controlled parts of these regions during the Piast dynasty.
[8] Additional 700 thousand Germans were expelled from central Poland.

(including members of other West-Slavic groups) and some 150 thousand Ukrainians and Belarusians were thus resettled in the formerly German territories after the war (Kamusella, 2004). While the settlers from central Poland were voluntary, the resettlement of Polish refugees from Kresy was largely involuntary in that they were forced to leave by the Soviet government. Similarly, the removal of ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians from the areas close to the newly established Eastern border was imposed by the Polish authorities with the objective of accelerating their polonization. The Slavic minorities – Kashubians, Masurians and Silesians – were allowed to stay. These were West-Slavic groups that used to live both in pre-war Poland and in the annexed territories. Although most of them were given the German nationality during the War (or already had it during the pre-war period), they were seen by the Poles as polonizable and were not expelled.

Another area affected by large scale population transfer was the *Sudetenland* region of Czechoslovakia. Sudetenland is a label applied to the German-majority region alongside the pre-WW2 borders between Czechoslovakia and Germany which was annexed by Germany in 1938 following the conclusion of the Munich Agreement. Initially ethnically mixed, many of the Czech (and Jewish) inhabitants fled or were expelled following the German annexation. After the war, the vast majority of Germans were expelled to Germany or Austria: their number is estimated at 3-3.5 million (Pykel, 2004). The expulsion was proposed by the Czechoslovak government in exile and, as in the Polish case, it was formally sanctioned by the Allies. Sudetenland was subsequently repopulated by settlers from the rest of Czechoslovakia: besides Czechs, the settlers also included Slovaks as well as ethnic Roma and Hungarians from Slovakia and ethnic Czechs resettled from the Soviet Union (after several generations there). The resettlement was in part driven by economic opportunism: settlers were able to acquire ownership of properties and even personal effects abandoned by the expelled Germans who were allowed to take only limited possessions with them. Compulsion was also involved, in particular in the case of the Roma and Hungarians: the intention was to lower their regional concentration in Slovakia and to hasten their assimilation into the majority population. Following the communist take-over in 1948, Sudetenland was also used to resettle political opponents of the new regime and ex-convicts.[9] As Matějka (2008) recounts, this transplantation of people with very different backgrounds resulted in a persistent sense of alienation: for example, even after living in Sudetenland for many years,

[9] This practice is documented in the concluding part of *I Served the King of England*, a novel by Bohumil Hrabal.

its residents were reluctant to call their region 'home'. In present territorial structure, the Sudetenland region corresponds to the Severozapadny (North-West) region as well as parts of Severovychodny (North-East) and Juhozapadny (South-West) regions.

In the wake of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was forced to cede territory also to Hungary (Southern Slovakia and Ruthenia) and Poland (Czech Silesia). While these territories were reinstated to Czechoslovakia after the war (except Ruthenia, which was annexed by the Soviet Union), the population transfers that took place there were much more limited than those in Sudetenland.

Germans were also expelled from other countries following the conclusion of the war: Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary and the Netherlands are notable examples. In these cases, however, neither the regional concentrations of ethnic Germans prior to expulsion nor the size of the resulting population transfer were comparable to the Polish and Czech cases.[10]

After World War I, Italy annexed *Venezia Giulia* (Julian March), a region encompassing Istria, the islands along Dalmatian coast as well as areas on the coast itself, which were until then controlled by Austria-Hungary. The population of these areas was mixed, with Italians living alongside South-Slavs (Slovenes and Croats). Following the war, Yugoslav troops occupied the Eastern and Southern parts of Venezia Giulia while British and American troops occupied the Western part, including the city of Trieste, and also an area around Pola (an Allied enclave in the South of Istria, now known as Pula). These lines of control largely turned into the permanent border between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1947 (with the Pola enclave ceded to Yugoslavia). The status of Trieste remained disputed for longer: the city itself was mainly Italian while the surrounding countryside was predominantly Slovene. Initially, it was to become the Free State Trieste but neither the Yugoslavs nor the Allies relinquished control of the parts that they held. In 1954, these parts were appended to Yugoslavia and Italy, respectively, with the city and its immediate hinterlands, held by the Allies, joining Italy.

It is estimated that the population of Venezia Giulia counted 590 thousand Italians and 380 thousand Slovenes and Croats in 1936: more than 200 thousand Italians left the areas

[10] Hungary was the only other country which, according to the Postdam Agreement, was expected to transfer its German population to Germany. Around 200,000 to 250,000 Germans left or were expelled, approximately half of their number before the war, mostly from the area around Budapest, the capital (Apor, 2004). In Yugoslavia and Romania, the numbers of Germans who left, were forcibly expelled, killed or deported to the Soviet Union as POWs were likewise in the hundreds of thousands rather than millions as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Germans in the Baltic countries, in contrast, mostly left already at the beginning of World War II when the Baltics were occupied by the Soviet Union.

annexed by Yugoslavia (Ballinger, 2011). In contrast with the expulsions of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Italian exodus was largely voluntary: the residents of the annexed areas were given the option to move to Italy (some moved already during the last months of the war after massacres perpetrated against Italians by Yugoslav troops and guerillas). Besides Italians, some Slovenes and Croats who were unhappy with the communist regime used this opportunity to leave Yugoslavia as well.

In the present territorial structure of Slovenia, the annexed parts of Venezia Giulia roughly correspond to the Goriška (Gorizzia) and Obalno-kraška (Coastal-Karst) regions. I do not include the parts of Julian March that are at present in Croatia in the analysis for two reasons. First, the regional structure of Croatia is very coarse, with the formerly Italian regions joined into much larger territorial entities. This makes it impossible to separate the regions affected by population transfers from the rest of the country. Second, Croatia experienced large population transfers also in the 1990s, during and after its war of independence. Without pre-independence data, it would be difficult to distinguish the impacts of these two episodes from each other.

The final observation of a large-scale population transfer differs dramatically from the preceding ones in that it was not instigated by war but instead resulted from land reclamation in the Netherlands. The inland sea, the *Zuiderzee*, was closed off by a dam (*Afsluitdijk*) in 1932 as a flood control measure. This both protected the inland areas from the danger of flooding and allowed for parts of the resulting lake, renamed *IJsselmeer*, to be drained and reclaimed. The reclamation was completed in three steps: in 1942 (North-East), 1957 (East) and 1968 (South). The reclaimed area was eventually reconstituted into a new province, *Flevoland*, in 1986. With the exception of two former islands, *Urk* and *Schokland* (the latter being uninhabited since 1859), the vast majority of the province is therefore former sea bed. The current population, 388 thousand by 2009, is thus mainly composed of relatively recent immigrants and their descendants.[11] Moreover, the Dutch government sought to distribute the settlers from various origins evenly over the reclaimed areas rather than allow them to settle in villages dominated by populations stemming from the same region. One consequence of this is that Flevoland is said to be the only province whose inhabitants speak the official version of Dutch rather than a regional dialect.

[11] The population of Urk, the former island and now town in Flevoland, is approximately 20 thousand.

A notable example of mass migration that is missing from our analysis is Israel. Much of the population of this country, especially when excluding the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, are migrants and descendants of relatively recent migrants. However, in this case, the entire country has been subjected to population transfer and therefore it lacks a control group.

In summary, the analysis thus considers 15 regions that were affected by large-scale population transfers: seven in present-day Poland, three in the Czech Republic, two in Ukraine and in Slovenia, and one in the Netherlands. The vast majority of these cases involved involuntary expulsion and/or flight of members of a particular ethnic group in the aftermath of the World War II, with the depopulated regions resettled by nationals of the victorious country. The resettlement, however, was only in part voluntary and some of the settlers were themselves forced or compelled to move. The only exception to this pattern of war-induced population transfers is the Dutch region of Flevoland whose settlement was the result of land reclamation rather than expulsion.

3 Measuring Social Capital

The objective of this paper is to see whether the inhabitants of regions that experienced large-scale population transfers some 50-60 years ago still have lower stocks of social capital at present than the residents of unaffected regions. In other words, the question is how quickly social capital can be regenerated after it is lost or diminished due to an exogenous shock. The shock in this case is the population transfer: those who have moved tend to lose much of their initial social capital and have to rebuild it anew at their destination.

The analysis is based on the first four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS henceforth) carried out every two years between 2000 and 2008 in 30 countries in Europe and its neighborhood: besides the EU/EEA countries, Turkey, Russia and Israel are also included. I consider the respondents' answers to the following three questions:

(1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

(2) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

(3) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

Answers to all three questions range from 0 (most people cannot be trusted, take advantage and look out for themselves) to 10 (most can be trusted, try to be fair and try to be helpful). Generalized trust (question 1) is a standard measure of social capital: trust encourages cooperation and reduces free riding. The remaining two questions reflect similar concepts of fairness and cooperativeness. In all three cases, higher values are generally assumed to be associated with higher social capital.

The drawback of the aforementioned questions, however, is that they do not necessarily measure the respondent's stock of social capital but instead reflect the average level of social capital in the respondent's social circles. For instance, an individual can find others trustworthy without being trustworthy herself. Therefore, I also utilize another three questions that reflect more directly the density and quality of the respondent's social contacts:

(4) How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?

(5) Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters?

(6) Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?

The possible answers to question (4) are never, less than once a month, once a month, several times a month, once a week, several times a week, and every day. Question (5) is dichotomous, allowing the respondents to answer only no or yes. Finally, the answers to question (6) can be much less than most, less than most, about the same, more than most, and much more than most. Again, higher values reflect greater social capital. In contrast to the first three questions, however, the social capital captured by these questions may be more of the bonding rather than bridging type.

Table 1 summarizes the responses to these six questions across the countries included in the analysis. A similar pattern emerges with respect to all six measures: social capital tends to be high in Northern and North-Western European countries, with Scandinavian countries appearing especially well-endowed. On the other hand, social capital is low in Southern and Eastern European countries: Turkey scores worst on five measures out of six.

The analysis is carried out by means of an ordered logit, with the exception of question (5) which is analyzed by simple logit. The respondents who refused to answer any of the questions used or answered them with 'don't know' are omitted. The regressions account for the respondents' socio-economic characteristics and include also country-specific fixed effects. To assess whether inhabitants of the regions affected by population transfers have lower or higher stock of social capital, I include dummies for those regions. If they inherited lower stock of social capital as a result of population transfers in the past, and this effect was sufficiently persistent, then the coefficients estimated for these dummies should be significantly negative.

4 Long-term Impact of Population Transfers on Social Capital

I start by comparing average values for the social capital indicators as well as for a number of socio-economic characteristics for the repopulated (treated) and unaffected (control) regions. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2: for each of the five countries affected by population transfers separately (the remaining counties would only have control but no treated regions). The respondents with missing or don't-know answers are excluded. The column comparing the average values for treated and control regions should be particularly informative. Differences between treated and control regions, if any, could be the legacy of the population transfer. They could also be attributable to self-selection of settlers moving into the repopulation regions, or reflect the different nature of these regions (such as the fact that they are more peripheral).

This descriptive exercise suggests that the repopulated regions are rather similar to the control regions on most, though not necessarily all, measures. In particular, the shares of foreign born and ethnic minority individuals tend to be different. There are also some notable differences with respect to employment categories. As far as social capital measures are concerned, we observe little different. The treated and control regions are also remarkably similar with respect to basic demographic characteristics such as gender composition, share of married/cohabiting individuals, average education or average age (except Flevoland, where respondents tend to be younger than in the rest of the Netherlands).

Table 3 presents the results of baseline regressions controlling for respondents' individual socio-economic characteristics as well as for country and wave fixed effects. The results are

quite intuitive, similar across all six measures of social capital and also generally in line with previous work on individual determinants of social capital (see Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008). Age has a U-shaped effect on social capital: as individuals get older, their social capital declines and then rebounds again. The individuals with the most negative opinion of others (questions 1-3) are those aged between 35 and 40. In contrast, the minimum social participation is observed at a much higher age, around 70-85, so that the profile of social participation is effectively declining throughout with respect to age. Higher education is associated with greater stock of social capital and this social-capital premium is increasing with the level of education. Students have more social capital while those who are unemployed, inactive or sick/disabled tend to have less social capital. Retired persons are generally more distrustful of others but tend to be more socially active. Whether one lives in an urban or rural environment matters although the observed pattern differs somewhat between trust and similar attitudes and social activities. Individuals who were born abroad or belong to an ethnic minority may possess different stocks of social capital than the indigenous/majority population: because of different culture and social norms, because they are ostracized by the majority population and/or because they are more closely integrated into the diaspora community. The results are mixed: being foreign born seems to have a mixed effect on attitudes towards others and positive effect on social activities, while belonging to an ethnic minority has a predominantly negative effect. Finally, most of the country effects (not reported) are significant, confirming that the differences in social capital across countries are large and cannot be attributed to differences in socio-economic characteristics.

Next, I add a dummy variable for regions affected by population transfers. These results are summarized in Table 4. The regressions control for the respondents' individual characteristics and include also country and wave fixed effects. Only the coefficients for the dummy are reported as the remaining coefficients (available upon request) are very similar to those reported in Table 3. The coefficients therefore show whether respondents in the regions that experienced large-scale population exchange have a different stock of social capital than other respondents with similar characteristics living in the same country. Panel A adds a summary dummy for all the regions enumerated in section 2. The repopulated regions appear to have less social capital when it is measured by trust but do significantly better than the remaining regions with respect to social meetings. The remaining measures are insignificant. In Panel B, this dummy is defined slightly differently: in ESS2, when the regional information for the Czech Republic is more detailed, only the region of Liberec is included while Hradec

Kralove and Pardubice are omitted, as these were predominantly outside of the Sudetenland area. The different definition has little effect on the regression results. Finally, Panels C through F consider individual ESS waves. Again, there is little evidence that the repopulated regions have significantly more or less social capital than the regions not affected by population transfers.

In Table 5, I add individual coefficients for all 15 regions, across all four ESS waves. Again, the coefficients for the broad array of individual socio-economic characteristics are not reported. None of the regions appears systematically affected the legacy of large-scale population transfer. Table 6 reports the results of similar analysis where I consider only the countries affected by population transfers one at a time. Again, there appears to be no systematic different between the individuals living in repopulation regions and the rest.

As a final test, I consider only those individuals who are likely to have been personally affected by the population transfer. The survey does not allow me to distinguish between the original settlers and those who may have moved into the region at a later stage (and under much less dramatic circumstances). Instead, I rely on the fact that the population transfer took place in the mid to late 1940s and early 1950s. Therefore, the original settlers should be around 60 or older during the 2000s, when the ESS surveys were carried out. In Table 7, therefore, I only consider individuals above the age of 60, 65, 70, 75 and 80. Once again, no permanent legacy of population exchange is apparent in the results.

5 Discussion

The results of the preceding analysis suggest that, by and large, the repopulated regions do not seem to suffer any penalty in terms of lower social capital after a lag of approximately two generations. This conclusion is remarkably robust to changes in the analytical set up: grouping all repopulation together or considering them separately, looking only at countries affected by population transfers, and considering only the elderly, who experienced the population transfer first hand.

How can this finding be reconciled with the observation of persistently lower social in the Mezzigiorno and post-communist Eastern Europe? Two, not mutually exclusive, explanations can be put forward. First, the productivity of social capital is likely to be conditional on the formal or informal institutions for dispute resolution: trust and reciprocity are only productive

if one has sufficient protection from predatory behavior. Greif (1994) makes this argument in the context of his analysis of medieval traders who complemented social networks with either informal (collectivist) institutions or formal (second-party) enforcement. When neither formal nor informal institutions are present, investment in social capital has little return. Therefore, the Mezzogiorno's and post-communist countries' underdevelopment need not be caused by low social capital. Rather, the low stock of social capital in these regions may reflect the poor institutional environment there (cf. Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008).

Second, the institutions for conflict resolution can be invalidated by nepotism, corruption and organized crime. In the Mezzogiorno, organized crime (the Mafia and similar crime syndicates) arose at the time of the Italian reunification. Dickle (2014) and Bandiera (2002) point out that the Sicilian Mafia emerged during the period between the end of feudalism in Sicily in 1812 and its annexation by Italy in 1860.[12] During this period, the nobility ceased to provide private law enforcement and security; at the same time, land redistribution dramatically increased the number of landowners with assets vulnerable to predation. In the absence of state-provided law and order and in the chaos associated with the annexation of the South by the emerging Italian state, the Mafia arose to fill the void (Skaperdas, 2001).[13] In the Mezzogiorno, the organized crime remained entrenched because it largely succeeded to capture and subvert the local (and to some extent also central) politicians and law enforcement, thus cementing its position (see Allum, 2006; Geys and Daniele, 2014, and the references therein).[14] This symbiosis between organized crime and local government persists to this day, as the evidence reported in Acconcia, Corsetti and Siminelli (2014) demonstrates.[15] Therefore, the low social capital in the Mezzogiorno can be attributed to the replacement of the strong government by a weak one at the time of the Italian reunification, which lead to the emergence of organized crime which in turn captured the local government. The resulting poor institutional environment is not conducive to investing in social capital.

[12] Other organized crime groups in South Italy, such as the Camorra in and around Naples and 'Ndrangheta in Calabria, received less scholarly attention than the Sicilian Mafia, but their origins appear to be similarly relatively recent and coincide with the end of feudalism, ascent of market-based capitalist system, and Italian reunification.

[13] De Rosa (1988) argues similarly that the economic and social backwardness of South Italy has been caused by the economic policies imposed on the South by the Northern rulers following its forced annexation to Italy in the last stages of Italian reunification.

[14] Former Prime Ministers Giulio Andreotti and Sylvio Berlusconi were accused (though not convicted) of being connected to organized crime. Mario Puzo's The Godfather gives repeated examples of how the US Mafia captured local politicians and crime enforcement.

[15] Acconcia et al. (2014) use the dismissal of Mafia-connected local politicians to identify exogenous shocks to government spending and to measure the size of the fiscal multiplier.

A similar pattern played out in the post-communist countries, which had little crime during the communist era but experienced deterioration of law and order and burgeoning crime (and corruption) after the collapse of that regime. Some post-communist countries managed to restore law and order and put in place sound institutions: these are now fast catching up both economically and with respect to social capital. In Russia and much of the former Soviet Union, organized crime and corruption reach the highest echelons of power and may have become institutionalized (for detailed accounts of the Russian experience, see Dawisha, 2014, and Browder, 2015). [16] As in the South Italian case, it is the failure to reinstate a strong government and create effective law enforcement and institutions for conflict resolution which appear to account for the low stock of social capital, not the legacy of the preceding authoritarian regime.

6 Conclusions

The results of my analysis suggest that the population transfers that took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s have had little lasting effect on social capital: barely half a century later, the people in these regions possess as much social capital as similar people in other areas of the same country. This suggests that social capital is not very persistent. If social capital is destroyed by an adverse shock, it can be rebuilt relatively quickly. Such adverse negative shocks as authoritarian regimes and wars need not have lasting effects persisting for many generations.

The results of this paper should not be taken as implying that authoritarian regimes do not destroy social capital. Rather, the legacy of the destruction of social capital may or may not be permanent, depending on the circumstances under which it happened. If the circumstances are such that investing in social capital is productive, social capital can be rebuilt relatively quickly, as happened in the repopulated regions that I consider in my analysis. In other circumstances, such as those prevailing in the Mezzogiorno after the Italian reunification or in the post-communist countries after the fall of Communism, the effect may well turn out to be

[16] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) instituted a Person of the Year Award, given to the person or organization who it believes "has done the most during the year to promote organized criminal activity or advance corruption". Since its inception, this honor was bestowed upon Ilham Aliyev (2012), president of Azerbaijan, the Parliament of Romania (2013), and Vladimir Putin (2014), Russian president (http://occrp.org/person-of-the-year/2014/).

permanent. The extent to which organized crime succeeded in capturing local, and even central-level, politicians and law enforcement is a likely to be instrumental in this context.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the results of my analysis differ little between regions where population transfers were the result of war and forced expulsions, and Flevoland, where they were voluntary and entirely non-violent. As dramatic and deplorable as war-related population expulsions are, they do not seem to leave scars that are any deeper than other population transfers.

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Table 1 Social Capital in Europe

Variable [Scale]	Trust People [0-10]	People Fair [0-10]	People Help [0-10]	Meet Socially [1-7]	Discuss Matters [0-1]	Socially Active [1-5]
Austria	5.1	5.7	5.2	5.1	0.90	2.8
Belgium	5.0	5.7	4.6	5.2	0.88	2.7
Bulgaria	3.4	4.4	3.2	4.8	0.85	3.0
Switzerland	5.7	6.4	5.5	5.2	0.96	2.7
Cyprus	4.2	4.6	4.1	4.3	0.90	2.6
Czech Rep.	4.4	5.2	4.2	4.5	0.81	2.6
Germany	4.7	5.8	4.9	4.8	0.95	2.7
Denmark	6.9	7.3	6.1	5.4	0.93	2.9
Estonia	5.4	5.7	4.9	4.5	0.86	2.4
Spain	5.0	5.3	4.5	5.4	0.93	2.6
Finland	6.5	6.8	5.8	5.1	0.92	2.8
France	4.4	5.7	4.5	5.2	0.88	3.0
UK	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.1	0.92	2.7
Greece	3.9	3.8	3.2	4.0	0.90	2.7
Croatia	4.4	4.6	3.7	5.3	0.88	2.5
Hungary	4.2	4.7	4.3	3.7	0.92	2.4
Ireland	5.4	5.9	5.9	4.8	0.91	2.7
Israel	5.1	5.3	4.7	5.3	0.87	2.7
Italy	4.4	4.6	3.9	4.9	0.80	2.4
Luxembourg	5.1	5.6	4.7	5.1	0.91	2.7
Netherlands	5.8	6.3	5.4	5.4	0.93	2.8
Norway	6.7	7.0	6.0	5.7	0.94	2.9
Poland	4.0	4.8	3.5	4.3	0.89	2.6
Portugal	3.9	4.9	3.9	5.7	0.89	2.6
Russia	4.0	4.9	4.0	4.4	0.89	2.6
Sweden	6.2	6.6	6.0	5.3	0.92	2.9
Slovenia	4.1	4.8	4.5	4.6	0.91	2.7
Slovakia	4.1	4.6	4.0	4.8	0.86	2.5
Turkey	2.6	3.4	3.2	4.8	0.59	2.4
Ukraine	4.1	4.5	3.7	4.5	0.85	2.9
Average	4.8	5.3	4.6	4.9	0.88	2.7

Notes: The answers to the questions on generalized trust, perceived fairness and helpfulness (columns 1-3) range between 0 and 10. Meeting people socially takes values 1 through 7. Having someone to discuss personal/intimate matters takes values 0 and 1. Participating in social activities takes values 1 through 5. Higher values always indicate higher stock of social capital. The numbers are averages across the first five ESS waves (2000-08).

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Treated and Control Regions

	Poland			Czech Republic			Slovenia			Ukraine			Netherlands		
	C	T	T/C	C	T	T/C	C	T	T/C	C	T	T/C	C	T	T/C
Trust People	2.92	2.91	*1.00*	3.39	3.10	0.91	4.19	4.24	*1.01*	2.79	3.00	*1.08*	5.15	5.16	*1.00*
People Fair	4.68	4.69	*1.00*	5.18	5.17	1.00	4.81	4.96	*1.03*	4.52	4.60	*1.02*	6.25	6.10	*0.98*
People Helpful	3.36	3.43	*1.02*	4.11	4.11	1.00	4.48	4.57	*1.02*	3.71	3.51	*0.95*	5.34	4.98	*0.93*
Meet Socially	4.25	4.38	*1.03*	4.40	4.46	1.01	4.57	4.69	*1.03*	4.49	4.68	*1.04*	5.36	5.45	*1.02*
Discuss Matters	0.88	0.89	*1.01*	0.81	0.81	1.00	0.91	0.92	*1.02*	0.86	0.83	*0.97*	0.93	0.97	*1.05*
Socially Active	2.59	2.59	*1.00*	2.59	2.55	0.98	2.66	2.71	*1.02*	2.93	2.95	*1.01*	2.83	2.87	*1.01*
Happiness	6.76	6.82	*1.01*	6.83	6.77	0.99	7.13	7.21	*1.01*	5.43	6.05	*1.11*	7.71	7.71	*1.00*
Health	2.45	2.41	*0.98*	2.41	2.41	1.00	2.46	2.31	*0.94*	3.00	2.81	*0.94*	2.17	2.10	*0.96*
Pray	2.54	2.81	*1.10*	5.81	6.20	1.07	4.97	4.91	*0.99*	3.97	1.70	*0.43*	4.78	5.07	*1.06*
Education	11.61	11.67	*1.01*	12.44	12.16	0.98	11.47	11.54	*1.01*	11.63	11.23	*0.97*	12.86	13.98	*1.09*
Partner	0.59	0.59	*1.01*	0.57	0.55	0.96	0.60	0.59	*0.97*	0.54	0.56	*1.04*	0.62	0.57	*0.93*
Male	0.48	0.48	*0.99*	0.48	0.48	1.00	0.46	0.46	*0.98*	0.37	0.43	*1.16*	0.45	0.37	*0.82*
Age	43.33	43.31	*1.00*	48.44	48.92	1.01	45.63	45.95	*1.01*	49.31	47.31	*0.96*	48.99	43.20	*0.88*
Paid Work	0.48	0.45	*0.94*	0.52	0.50	0.97	0.46	0.47	*1.02*	0.42	0.41	*0.97*	0.57	0.64	*1.14*
Student	0.16	0.16	*1.00*	0.07	0.07	0.98	0.18	0.21	*1.11*	0.07	0.11	*1.55*	0.09	0.11	*1.32*
Unemployed	0.06	0.07	*1.27*	0.03	0.03	1.18	0.04	0.03	*0.86*	0.04	0.06	*1.58*	0.02	0.03	*1.66*
Inactive	0.03	0.03	*1.01*	0.01	0.02	1.49	0.04	0.02	*0.57*	0.02	0.03	*1.48*	0.02	0.02	*1.44*
Sick	0.02	0.02	*0.97*	0.03	0.04	1.43	0.02	0.02	*0.90*	0.02	0.03	*1.37*	0.06	0.07	*1.26*
Retired	0.29	0.29	*0.98*	0.32	0.31	0.98	0.29	0.31	*1.09*	0.39	0.34	*0.88*	0.20	0.10	*0.47*
Homeworker	0.19	0.22	*1.11*	0.16	0.16	0.99	0.26	0.30	*1.15*	0.23	0.27	*1.18*	0.39	0.53	*1.35*
Foreign Born	0.01	0.02	*3.74*	0.03	0.04	1.47	0.08	0.11	*1.46*	0.12	0.04	*0.34*	0.08	0.11	*1.35*
Ethnic Minority	0.01	0.03	*2.07*	0.03	0.02	0.*95*	0.03	0.02	*0.91*	0.05	0.02	*0.40*	0.05	0.10	*1.77*

Notes: Only individuals included in the analysis considered (omitting those who replied ‘Don’t know’ or Refuse to answer’). C and T refer to treated and control regions, the column denoted T/C reports their ratio.

Table 3 Determinants of Social Capital: Benchmark Regressions

	Trust People	People Fair	People Help	Meet Socially	Discuss Matters	Socially Active
Male	0.105	-0.154	-0.124	0.093	-0.472	0.037
	(0.009)**	(0.009)**	(0.009)**	(0.009)**	(0.018)**	(0.010)**
Age	-0.012	-0.011	-0.013	-0.055	-0.056	0.003
	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)*
Age sqrd/1000	0.182	0.201	0.206	0.319	0.338	-0.096
	(0.017)**	(0.017)**	(0.017)**	(0.017)**	(0.029)**	(0.018)**
Education years	0.038	0.041	0.019	0.007	0.058	0.044
	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.003)**	(0.001)**
Household members	0.027	0.031	0.028	0.008	-0.010	0.028
(number)	(0.004)**	(0.004)**	(0.004)**	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)**
Children in household	0.030	-0.011	-0.010	-0.166	0.020	-0.188
(dummy)	(0.012)*	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)**	(0.024)	(0.013)**
Married/cohabitating	-0.012	0.031	-0.021	-0.375	0.825	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.011)**	(0.011)*	(0.011)**	(0.020)**	(0.011)
Suburb of city [(1)]	-0.006	-0.025	-0.054	0.008	-0.011	-0.029
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)**	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.017)
Town [(1)]	-0.032	-0.001	-0.023	0.047	-0.051	-0.052
	(0.013)*	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)**	(0.025)*	(0.013)**
Village [(1)]	0.004	0.040	0.065	0.075	-0.076	-0.044
	(0.013)	(0.013)**	(0.013)**	(0.013)**	(0.025)**	(0.014)**
Farm/countryside [(1)]	-0.090	0.101	0.150	-0.039	-0.123	-0.187
	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.022)	(0.043)**	(0.023)**
Coping with income [(2)]	-0.293	-0.232	-0.147	-0.154	-0.154	-0.236
	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.011)**	(0.024)**	(0.012)**
Difficult with income [(2)]	-0.500	-0.507	-0.380	-0.372	-0.442	-0.518
	(0.015)**	(0.015)**	(0.015)**	(0.015)**	(0.029)**	(0.015)**
Very difficult [(2)]	-0.764	-0.797	-0.651	-0.561	-0.702	-0.893
	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.036)**	(0.022)**
Paidwork [(3)]	-0.025	0.002	-0.009	-0.111	0.251	0.102
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)**	(0.031)**	(0.016)**
Student [(3)]	0.265	0.198	0.120	0.398	0.423	0.367
	(0.020)**	(0.020)**	(0.020)**	(0.020)**	(0.049)**	(0.021)**
Unemployed [(3)]	-0.164	-0.116	-0.099	0.054	-0.070	0.036
	(0.026)**	(0.025)**	(0.025)**	(0.026)*	(0.047)	(0.027)
Inactive [(3)]	-0.130	-0.125	-0.111	0.024	-0.085	-0.038
	(0.033)**	(0.033)**	(0.033)**	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.035)
Sick/disabled [(3)]	-0.226	-0.233	-0.150	-0.152	-0.100	-0.624
	(0.027)**	(0.027)**	(0.027)**	(0.028)**	(0.045)*	(0.029)**
Retired [(3)]	-0.055	-0.047	-0.050	0.046	0.106	0.062
	(0.019)**	(0.019)*	(0.019)**	(0.019)*	(0.034)**	(0.020)**
Homeworker [(3)]	0.044	0.010	0.010	0.031	-0.036	-0.061
	(0.012)**	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)**	(0.025)	(0.013)**

Foreign born	-0.226	0.079	-0.002	0.114	0.314	0.199
	(0.017)**	(0.017)**	(0.016)	(0.017)**	(0.031)**	(0.017)**
Ethnic minority	0.037	-0.189	-0.153	0.014	-0.090	-0.009
	(0.022)	(0.021)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)	(0.037)*	(0.022)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	167,522	171,071	171,839	172,135	171,097	169,095

Notes: See text and notes to Table 1 for explanation of the dependent variables and their measurement. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%.

Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity.

Table 4 Determinants of Social Capital: Repopulated Regions

	Trust People	People Fair	People Help	Meet Socially	Discuss Matters	Socially Active
Repopulated dummy	-.088	.032	.010	.109	.068	-.017
	(.028)**	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)**	(.049)	(.030)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.102	.038	.017	.123	.037	-.029
(alt. definition)	(.028)**	(.029)	(.029)	(.028)**	(.050)	(.030)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.039	-.017	.124	.094	.110	.004
ESS Wave 1	(.057)	(059)	(.059)*	(.058)	(.107)	(.061)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.062	.061	-.032	.092	026	-.046
ESS Wave 2	(.050)	(.051)	(.051)	(.050)	(.084)	(.054)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.183	-.024	.006	.232	.173	.071
ESS Wave 3	(.068)**	(.068)	(.069)	(.068)**	(.136)	(.072)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.040	.065	-.051	.082	.061	-.049
ESS Wave 4	(.052)	(.053)	(.053)	(.052)	(.091)	(.056)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See text and notes to Table 1 for explanation of the dependent variables and their measurement. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%. The repopulated regions are Dolnoslaskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, Warminsko-mazurskie, Zachodnopomorskie, Pomorskie and Slaskie in Poland, Severozapadny, Severovychodny and Juhozapadny in the Czech Republic, Goriska and Obalno-kraska in Slovenia, and Lviv and Tarnopol in Ukraine. In the alternative definition, Severovychodny region in the Czech Republic includes Liberec but omits Hradec Kralove and Pardubice in ESS waves 1 and 2 where more detailed regional data are available. The regressions include also individual-level control variables (see Table 3), country dummies and wave dummies (where appropriate), the estimated coefficient for these are not reported to conserve space.

Table 5 Determinants of Social Capital: Repopulated Regions, Individual regional dummies

	Trust People	People Fair	People Help	Meet Socially	Discuss Matters	Socially Active
Flevoland	-0.021	-0.174	-0.253	-0.032	1.076	-0.015
	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.514)*	(0.146)
Severozapadny	-0.095	0.114	0.188	0.038	0.039	-0.135
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.080)*	(0.077)	(0.117)	(0.083)
Severovychodny	-207.261	8.513	-59.750	89.562	153.982	-55.802
	(65.378)**	(67.217)	(67.162)	(66.348)	(102.568)	(71.660)
Juhozapadny	-0.248	0.074	0.016	0.091	0.018	0.104
	(0.070)**	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.111)	(0.077)
Dolnoslaskie	0.093	0.003	0.066	0.078	-0.077	-0.066
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.155)	(0.090)
Lubuskie	0.195	-0.096	0.089	0.292	0.236	0.190
	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.135)*	(0.266)	(0.138)
Opolskie	0.322	0.281	0.146	-0.024	0.222	-0.068
	(0.141)*	(0.141)*	(0.139)	(0.142)	(0.278)	(0.149)
Pomorskie	-0.082	0.285	0.282	0.102	0.097	0.093
	(0.095)	(0.096)**	(0.098)**	(0.092)	(0.183)	(0.098)
Slaskie	-0.171	-0.115	0.000	0.091	0.175	-0.087
	(0.066)**	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.134)	(0.070)
Warminsko-mazurskie	0.113	0.017	0.214	0.115	-0.060	-0.146
	(0.109)	(0.113)**	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.198)	(0.117)
Zachodnopomorskie	-0.199	0.054	-0.169	0.422	0.095	0.040
	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.107)**	(0.205)	(0.115)
Goriska	-0.022	0.287	0.160	-0.031	0.262	0.112
	(0.101)	(0.100)**	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.226)	(0.104)
Obalno-kraska	-0.137	-0.252	-0.189	0.344	0.042	-0.052
	(0.123)	(0.123)*	(0.123)	(0.124)**	(0.247)	(0.129)
Lviv	0.123	0.125	-0.237	0.140	-0.237	-0.004
	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.111)*	(0.106)	(0.172)	(0.110)
Tarnopol	-0.780	-0.656	-0.465	0.523	-0.784	-0.283
	(0.251)**	(0.263)**	(0.264)	(0.270)*	(0.376)*	(0.283)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	167,522	171,071	171,839	172,135	-	169,095

Notes: See text and notes to Table 1 for explanation of the dependent variables and their measurement. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%. The regressions include also individual-level control variables (see Table 3) and country and wave dummies, the estimated coefficient for these are not reported to conserve space.

Table 6 Determinants of Social Capital: Repopulated Regions, Individual Countries

	Trust People	People Fair	People Help	Meet Socially	Discuss Matters	Socially Active
Repopulated dummy	-.0133	-.0002	.0414	.1127	.0483	-.0168
Poland	(.0453)	(.0449)	(.0445)	(.0451)	(.0856)	(.0481)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.2000	.0615	.0223	.0897	.0843	-.0022
Czech Republic	(.0496)***	(.0495)	(.0492)	(.0497)*	(.0759)	(.0529)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.0771	.0507	-.0008	.1070	.1741	.0215
Slovenia	(.0816)	(.0792)	(.0803)	(.0807)	(.1757)	(.0853)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	.0174	-.0151	-.2239	.1129	-.2777	-.0513
Ukraine	(.1017)	(.0980)	(.0996)C**	(.0995)	(.1598)*	(.1047)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.1132	-.2177	-.2820	-.1029	1.0897	-.0072
Netherlands	(.1362)	(.1334)*	(.1382)**	(.1402)	(.5218)**	(.1451)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See text and notes to Table 1 for explanation of the dependent variables and their measurement. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%. The repopulated regions are Dolnoslaskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, Warminsko-mazurskie, Zachodnopomorskie, Pomorskie and Slaskie in Poland, Severozapadny, Severovychodny and Juhozapadny in the Czech Republic, Goriska and Obalno-kraska in Slovenia, and Lviv and Tarnopol in Ukraine. The regressions include also individual-level control variables (see Table 3), the estimated coefficient for these are not reported to conserve space.

Table 7 Determinants of Social Capital: Repopulated Regions, Individual Countries

	Trust People	People Fair	People Help	Meet Socially	Discuss Matters	Socially Active
Repopulated dummy	-.0874	-.0043	.0331	.1187	.1244	-.0298
Over 60	(.0580)	(.0591)	(.0593)	(.0578)**	(.0831)	(.0610)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.0507	.0226	.0308	.1049	.1225	.0225
Over 65	(.0695)	(.0704)	(.0708)	(.0688)	(.0975)	(.0727)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.0123	-.0564	-.0213	.1383	.0687	.0258
Over70	(.0876)	(.0880)	(.0883)	(.0862)	(.1170)	(.0905)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.0201	-.0747	.0238	.1945	.1057	.0150
Over 75	(.1189)	(.1187)	(.1184)	(.1165)*	(.1584)	(.1233)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Repopulated dummy	-.0713	-.1970	.0210	.2174	.1244	-.1326
Over 80	(.2003)	(.1950)	(.2004)	(.1927)	(.2574)	(.2056)
Controls/dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See text and notes to Table 1 for explanation of the dependent variables and their measurement. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%. The repopulated regions are Dolnoslaskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, Warminsko-mazurskie, Zachodnopomorskie, Pomorskie and Slaskie in Poland, Severozapadny, Severovychodny and Juhozapadny in the Czech Republic, Goriska and Obalno-kraska in Slovenia, and Lviv and Tarnopol in Ukraine. The regressions include also individual-level control variables (see Table 3) and country and wave dummies, the estimated coefficient for these are not reported to conserve space.