



REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (RIA) ON THE CROP INSURANCE REFORM OF GEORGIA

Final Presentation

ISET POLICY INSTITUTE

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INTRODUCTION

Agricultural insurance in Georgia in 2004-2010



Governing for

Growth



Source: Georgian Insurance Association (GIA)

- Lack of farmers' awareness and experience
- Lack of technical capacity (data, loss adjustment, distribution channels)

\rightarrow Absence of agricultural insurance market





INTRODUCTION

Pilot national agricultural insurance programs 2014 and 2015

General objectives of government intervention

- Develop the agricultural insurance market in Georgia
- Support agricultural production and increase competitiveness of farmers and agribusinesses
- Support the income of people involved in agriculture and minimize their risks





INTRODUCTION

Pilot insurance programs 2014 and 2015

	2014	2015 *
Policies sold	20'952	3'439
Total premiums (in million GEL)	12.5	2.0
Amount of subsidies (in million GEL)	11.7	1.1
Average level of subsidies (%)	94	55
Insured area (in ha)	18'596	3'112



Source: Agricultural Projects Management Agency (APMA) * July 2015





RIA PROCEDURES





RIA PROCEDURES

Stakeholder consultations (June-August 2015)

- Farmers and GFA
- Insurance companies and GIA
- APMA
- Agricultural insurance expert
- → Interviews, focus groups, and a workshop







POLICY OPTIONS





POLICY OPTIONS

Option 1 (Baseline): Government does not introduce
 NARMA but continues with the current pilot.

Option 2: Government adopts and develops NARMA model

Note: no budget cap





POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 1 (Baseline)	OPTION 2 (NARMA)
Continuation of pilot program	Creation of NARMA
Managed by APMA	PPP
Av. subsidy rate of 65% for small and large farms	Av. subsidy rate of 75% for small farms and 50% for large farms
Subsidies fixed for 10 years	Subsidies gradually decrease
No restriction on land plot size	No restriction on land plot size
Less investments in service quality improvement & awareness campaigns	More investments in service quality improvement & awareness campaigns









Small farms <= 5 ha Large farms > 5 ha







Penetration rate for 2016 (and afterwards):

1. Responsiveness

 small farms are twice as responsive to price change as large farms

2. Insurance experience

- Direct effect 1: Negative experience (APMA data on complaints)
- Direct effect 2: The level of skepticism
- Indirect effects: neighbors of insured farmers





Stakeholders	Costs	Benefits
Farmers	 Premiums paid 	 Indemnities received
Insurance companies (IC)	 Indemnities paid A&O costs Profit taxes Payments to reinsurers 	 Premiums collected from farmers Subsidies paid by the government Reinsurance commissions
Government	Premium subsidy paidProject running costs	 Profit taxes





Stakeholders	Costs	Benefits
Farmers	 Premiums paid 	 Indemnities received
Insurance companies (IC)	 Indemnities paid A&O costs (-5%) Profit taxes Payments to reinsurers (-1%) NARMA fee (12% of premiums) 	 Premiums collected from farmers Subsidies paid by the government Reinsurance commissions (0)
Government	 Premium subsidy paid Project running costs (0) NARMA set up costs 	Profit taxes
NARMA	 A&O costs Loss adjustment costs Distribution of subsidies to partner ICs 	 Start-up funds/equity Reinsurance commissions NARMA fee (12% of premiums) Premium subsidies















Comparison of costs and benefits of policy options (NPV, GEL)







NPV of net benefits for the stakeholders (million GEL)

Stakeholders	Option 1	Option 2
Small farmers	23.6	33.1
Large farmers	29.1	2.5
Insurance companies	60.8	34.0
NARMA		12.1
Government	-202.8	-147.2

Overall net benefit	-89.3	-65.5
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Some potential benefits not considered in quantitative part

- Reduced farmers' financial vulnerability
- Increased access to finance
- Increased investment in agricultural production

Other criteria (in addition to NPV):

- Effectiveness (in achieving Government's goals)
- Feasibility/Easy to comply
- Minimization of risks associated with the reform
- Maximizations of collateral benefits associated with the reform





EVALUATION CRITERIA	OPTION 1 (PILOT with Fixed Subsidy Level)	OPTION 2 (NARMA with Decreasing Subsidy Level)
Benefits-costs (NPV in million GEL)	-89.0	-65.5
Effectiveness 1	++	+++
Effectiveness 2	+	+
Effectiveness 3	++	+++
Feasibility / Ease to comply	++	+ +
Minimization of risks associated with the reform	++	+++
Maximizations of collateral benefits associated with the reform	++	+++
SUMMARY	++	+ + /+ + +





EVALUATION CRITERIA	OPTION 1 (PILOT with Fixed Subsidy Level)	OPTION 2 (NARMA with Decreasing Subsidy Level)	OPTION 1* (PILOT with Decreasing Subsidy Level)	OPTION 2* (NARMA with Fixed Subsidy Level)
Benefits-costs (NPV in million GEL)	-89.0	-65.5	-67.2	-71.9
Effectiveness 1	++	+++	+ +	+ + +
Effectiveness 2	+	+	+	+
Effectiveness 3	+ +	+ + +	+ +	+ + +
Feasibility / Ease to comply	+ +	++	+ +	+ +
Minimization of risks associated with the reform	+ +	+ + +	+ +	+ + +
Maximizations of collateral benefits associated with the reform	++	+++	+ +	+ + +
SUMMARY	++	+ + /+ + +	++	+ + /+ + +





CONCLUSION





CONCLUSION

- Penetration rate by 2025: 13.9% (Pilot) and 14.3% (NARMA)
 - \rightarrow NARMA with fixed subsidy: 18.5%
- Budget cap of 10 million GEL is not recommended

- Small farmers better off with NARMA
- Insurance companies better off with Pilot
- Government better off with NARMA





CONCLUSION

Crucial in achieving the long term government goals:

- Improvement in service quality
- Increase in the public confidence in agricultural insurance
- Providing a stable framework of public support reducing uncertainty for the agents
 - Systemic approach
 - Long-term government commitment
 - Stable subsidy scheme





Thank you!

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ANNEX





Predicted demand for agricultural insurance





Amount of land insured (Option 2)





RESULTS (Option 1)

Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
# of small farmers insured	31'501	34'067	36'869	39'936	43'298	46'990	51'056	55'544	60'511	66'027
# of large farmers insured	804	887	1'004	1'122	1'253	1'400	1'567	1'756	1'974	2'213
Amount of land insured by small farmers (ha)	15'080	16'308	17'649	19'117	20'726	22'494	24'440	26'589	28'967	31'607
Amount of land insured by large farmers (ha)	16'031	17'686	20'027	22'372	24'989	27'928	31'248	35'027	39'366	44'149
Penetration rate in terms of land	5.7%	6.3%	6.9%	7.6%	8.4%	9.3%	10.2%	11.3%	12.6%	13.9%
Penetration rate in terms of farmers	4.5%	4.8%	5.2%	5.7%	6.1%	6.7%	7.3%	7.9%	8.6%	9.4%





RESULTS (Option 2)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
# of small farmers insured	44'102	47'864	52'713	48'890	50'665	55'552	64'231	75'094	88'820	106'389
# of large farmers insured	703	771	772	636	658	723	838	978	1'150	1'355
Amount of land insured by small farmers (ha)	21'111	22'912	25'234	23'404	24'253	26'593	30'747	35'948	42'518	50'928
Amount of land insured by large farmers (ha)	14'027	15'378	15'402	12'681	13'122	14'413	16'712	19'508	22'939	27'018
Penetration rate in terms of land	6.5%	7.0%	7.5%	6.6%	6.9%	7.5%	8.7%	10.2%	12.0%	14.3%
Penetration rate in terms of farmers	6.2%	6.7%	7.4%	6.8%	7.1%	7.8%	9.0%	10.5%	12.4%	14.9%





INDICATORS	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 1 *	OPTION 2*
	(PILOT with Fixed	(NARMA with	(PILOT with	(NARMA with
	Subsidy Level)	Decreasing	Decreasing	Fixed Subsidy
		Subsidy Level)	Subsidy Level)	Level)
Benefits – costs (NPV) (in	-89.3	-65.5	-67.2	-71.9
million GEL)				
NPV of net benefits for the	23.6	33.1	19.6	39.0
small farmers (in million GEL)				
NBV of not bonofits for the	20.1	2.5	20.2	5.0
large farmers (in million GEL)	29.1	2.5	20.2	5.0
NPV of the insurance	60.8	34.0	46.2	37.6
companies (in million GEL)				
			450.0	
NPV of the Government (in million GEL)	-202.8	-147.2	-153.2	-167.4
NPV of NARMA (in million GEL)	-	12.1	-	13.9
Penetration rate in terms of land	13.9%	14.3 %	8.9%	18.5%