On June 28, the Georgian Parliament passed a bill imposing a moratorium on land acquisition by foreigners and foreign-owned legal entities till the end of 2014. The bill effectively reversed an earlier policy that welcomed foreigners to settle and invest in Georgia’s agricultural sector, a policy culminating in the seemingly outlandish program seeking to bring to Georgia – and offer fast-track naturalization to – dozens of expert farmers from South Africa.
Rattled by this policy reversal, groups representing the expat business community in Georgia are trying to coordinate on a strong message to be delivered to the Georgian lawmakers. The law, so the argument goes, will cripple foreign direct investment in, and lending to, the agricultural sector. According to a recent statement by Transparently International-Georgia, the law may also be unconstitutional.
It is difficult to imagine that the Georgian government and/or parliament need to be reminded of the immediate negative implications of the law. It is universally recognized that Georgia’s agriculture is in dire need of investment in physical capital and technology, all of which can only come from outside. By preventing foreigners from investing in the sector, the law will also slow down the efficiency-enhancing process of land consolidation. But are there any benefits associated with the moratorium? And, indeed, what problem does it attempt to solve?
A cynical and not particularly thoughtful interpretation is that the law was triggered by the specter of “Indians buying all of Georgia” and has no purpose other than addressing the racist sentiment of the Georgian plebs. The Indian investors are the problem, the cynical argument goes.
Yet, the problem is real. It has little to do with xenophobia. And it is not unique to Georgia. Unless carefully designed and implemented, large scale privatization of state-owned agricultural lands in immediate proximity to Georgian villages has the potential to trigger violence and social unrest of far graver consequences for investment – foreign and domestic – into the Georgian economy than the notorious moratorium. The organized protests Georgia saw in early 2013 – under the slogan “"Georgian land for Georgians" – provide a foretaste of what could follow (still) if Georgia’s policymakers fail to find a solution to this fundamental problem: how to bring the much needed investment in Georgia’s agriculture without threatening the livelihoods of small-scale subsistence farmers.
On Monday this week, I have accompanied Deputy Minister of Agriculture David Natrosvhili and the first Georgian ambassador to South Africa Beka Dvali on their visit to Sartichala. The purpose of the visit was to meet some of the Afrikaaner farmers who have settled in Sartichala during the last 3 years upon President Saakashvili’s invitation. Living and working with Sartichala residents, Piet Kemp and his colleagues singled out the issue of pasture land (lack thereof), which potentially threatens the livelihoods of local subsistence farmers and complicates their relationship with the Boer settlers.
At present, about 80% of formerly state-owned agricultural land in the Sartichala area is cultivated by Kemp and fellow Boer settlers. And the share of cultivated land is only likely to increase given the Boers’ ambitions and the ongoing GoG-financed improvements in the regional irrigation systems (a bottleneck for agricultural development). The practical implication is that Sartichala residents will have ever less land for grazing their 3-4 thousand cattle on which they depend for survival. The moment Sartichala cows start dying, the Boer farmers will be faced with the very same personal security issues they were seeking to escape by relocating to Georgia.
Kemp et al are very well aware of the problem and are making every effort to stay on good terms with the locals. This is not only about skillful diplomacy: the Boers are a major employer; some of their investments, e.g. in water pipelines and water management systems, have positive spillovers for the entire community; last but not least, the Boers are willing to use their know-how, equipment and money to help work out a permanent solution.
Given the original sin of privatizing agricultural (pasture) land without much concern for the future livelihoods of smallholder farmers – “stakeholders” without any stake in the privatization policy debate – the options that are currently on the table for Sartichala are obviously limited. Kemp offers his help (and resources) to introduce Sartichala farmers to more efficient cultivation methods in order to make better use of the small plots of land they received in the first wave of land privatization. Indeed, by using irrigation and applying a small amount of fertilizer, local farmers could feed much larger numbers of cows. Kemp is also willing to help introduce artificial insemination in order to propagate improved breeds and raise productivity.
The policy dilemma facing the Georgian government is that none of this is going to happen on a sufficient scale without external help. Neither the Boers, nor any other foreign investors (with the possible exception of such giants as Ferrero) can handle the entire financial burden of dealing with the original privatization sins committed by a succession of Georgian governments. The current administration has shown its commitment to protecting the new land owners’ property rights, yet, it may have to go beyond that. Georgia’s agricultural development may stall in the absence of an adequate policy response which can only be developed in collaboration with the Georgian farmer associations, the agribusiness community and the international donor community.
The (temporary) moratorium on foreign land ownership does not solve any of the above problems and poses new dilemmas. It creates a lot of uncertainty as to the future direction of Georgia’s economic reforms. It does not address the Boers’ concern for securing their property rights and investment. And it does not help increase agricultural productivity and incomes of Georgia’s smallholder farmers. By imposing the moratorium, however, the Georgian government showed awareness of the challenges inherent in rapid agricultural development and attempted to gain time in order to work out an acceptable solution.
Let’s hope that time thus gained will be not be wasted. Social calm and political stability that the moratorium seeks to achieve may be difficult to maintain given its negative implications for foreign and domestic investment in Georgia’s agriculture. One does not go without the other, certainly not in the long run.
Comments
thanks, Eric, for this thoughtful piece. I agree, there does need to be a strategy, not just buying time. One aspect that would be important is that it should become "hip" to talk about agriculture in Tbilisi, since this does require a good bit of thinking from all sides. One complicating factor is that Georgia does not have just one type of agriculture, but multiples, and that therefore one size is unlikely to fit all.
Great article, although it would be interesting to read about the benefits of the moratorium.
The implications are the moratorium are profound. It throws the rural financial sector into disarray as most banks and microfinance institutions are foreign invested, and they face the risk of defaulting mortgages being unenforceable in the future. The major losers of this moratorium, and what may follow, are not only the couple of hundred foreign investors in Georgian farmland, but the many tens of thousands of small-scale Georgian owners of freehold land who are now to face difficulty in raising finance for property improvements via mortgage, or difficulty in forming JV's for the same purpose. The State has overnight excluded more than 99% of potential buyers from the market, and hence potentially expropriated the future capital gains of many small-scale Georgian property owners without compensation, many of whom have bought mid-sized plots as a retirement nest-egg. If the moratorium is reversed, this problem may be abated.
interesting points, Simon. Is it established that this will become an obstacle to raising finance? Presumably a degree of foreign investment into banks and micro-finance institutions need not necessarily result in unenforceability, especially as a lien may not be considered to be a normal property sale/transaction.
Also, I still have to see the type of agricultural investment in Georgia that will return a 20% interest within the year, fairly reliably. Do those actually exist?
The issues with finance are confused; government is unwilling or unable to clarify this issue. If the bank seizes a property due to mortgage default, it may sit on the bank's books for years before they can sell it. In many countries, banks form Asset Management companies specifically to hold and trade these assets, which is a normal activity. There is no clarity about what the future holds in this regard. Hopefully a long-term exemption for banks and registered financial institutions, onshore and offshore, can be arranged to maintain confidence.
Non-bank financiers often take ownership of the borrowers' property prior to lending and return title to them when all loan contract conditions are satisfied. VC and Private Equity investors also commonly insist on their investments being protected in part by taking the title to the land until their initial investment has been returned as dividend. These mechanisms are now being restricted, which reduces options for seekers of finance or investment, and drives the cost of capital up as lenders and investors place bigger discounts on their valuations due to increased risk.
Bad weather and market fluctuations will affect profitability, but as a rule of thumb institutional agriculture investors from abroad are demanding an undiscounted internal rate of return in excess of 30% to consider investing in Georgia. With capital gain on the land beneath the enterprise, that can be done in many cases with modern management, but if the land is leased it is more difficult to achieve. If you are talking cash return on investment, the Turks would not be investing in greenhouses here if they couldn't achieve 20% + margins consistently.
Incidentally:
At the plenary session of 26 May 2013, a representative of the Parliamentary Majority, Gigla Agulashvili, stated: “New member states of the European Union: Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic imposed restrictions of various kinds upon foreigners. For instance, after its accession to the European Union, Poland introduced a restriction of twelve years for the alienation of agricultural lands to foreign citizens.” ... From studying the cases of the above mentioned countries, we find that they certainly have introduced various restrictions (not prohibitions) for foreigners who wish to purchase agricultural land. Although, if we take into consideration that with these examples Gigla Agulashvili aims to justify the prohibition of the alienation of agricultural lands in Georgia, these cases prove themselves to be irrelevant in this context. The draft law proposed in Georgia clearly intends to ban the alienation of agricultural lands altogether whereas the European countries introduced only restrictions on the property ownership.
http://factcheck.ge/en/article/gigla-agulashvili-newmember-states-of-the-european-union-poland-hungary-romania-andthe-czech-republicimpose-restrictions-of-various-kinds-upon-foreigners-for-instance-after-its-accessi/
RT: I just love the "mostly wrong" assessment by the factcheck guys.
Juan Echanove from the EU delegation prepared a note providing a detailed comparative analysis of the the regulations (restrictions) imposed by the various EU countries. I have not seen it, but know of its existence.